

The Internet Computer **Guest Lecture @ ETH Zurich**

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DFINITY

- Founded in 2016
- Staff: +250

Not-for-profit organization that develops the Internet Computer Headquarters: Zurich, Switzerland




What is the Internet Computer? Internet Computer Architecture

Closer Look: Consensus

Closer Look: HTTPS Outcalls

The Internet Computer Today





What is the Internet Computer?

Platform to run any computation, using blockchain technology for decentralization and security



Internet Computer Protocol (ICP)


Coordination of nodes in independent data centers, jointly performing any computation for anyone

Guarantees safety and liveness of smart contract execution despite Byzantine participants

ICP creates the Internet Computer blockchains

...

.....





ICP protocol

IP / Internet

Data Centers

A REAL PROPERTY OF


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
********* **********



Canister smart contract








Code: WebAssembly bytecode

Deploying and Using Canisters





Collection of replicated state machines that are tied together using advanced cryptography

Internet Computer Architecture






Nodes in Independent Data Centers a sector and 111111 11111 (a) (b) (b) (b) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ----. •••••••• •••••• *********************** . -----. A state of the state of the state 2.5 A 10 A 10 A 10 1.5 A 10 A 10 A 10 10 M 10 M 10 M 10 1.1 10 Mar 10 - -. . .






Single 48-byte public key



for a secret-shared private key



Chain Key Cryptography







Non-interactive distributed key generation and key resharing

Jens Groth¹

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Draft March 16, 2021

Abstract. We present a non-interactive publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme where a dealer can construct a Shamir secret sharing of a field element and confidentially yet verifiably distribute shares to multiple receivers. We also develop a non-interactive publicly verifiable resharing scheme where existing share holders of a Shamir secret sharing can create a new Shamir secret sharing of the same secret and distribute it to a set of receivers in a confidential, yet verifiable manner.

A public key may be associated with the secret being shared in the form of a group element raised to the secret field element. We use our verifiable secret sharing scheme to construct a non-interactive distributed key generation protocol that creates such a public key together with a secret sharing of the discrete logarithm. We also construct a non-interactive distributed resharing protocol that preserves the public key but creates a fresh secret sharing of the secret key and hands it to a set of receivers, which may or may not overlap with the original set of share holders.

Our protocols build on a new pairing-based CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme with forward secrecy. As a consequence our protocols can use static public keys for participants but still provide compromise protection. The scheme uses chunked encryption, which comes at a cost, but the cost is offset by a saving gained by our ciphertexts being comprised only of source group elements and no target group elements. A further efficiency saving is obtained in our protocols by extending our single-receiver encryption scheme to a multi-receiver encryption scheme, where the ciphertext is up to a factor 5 smaller than just having singlereceiver ciphertexts.

The non-interactive key management protocols are deployed on the Internet Computer to facilitate the use of threshold BLS signatures. The protocols provide a simple interface to remotely create secret-shared keys to a set of receivers, to refresh the secret sharing whenever there is a change of key holders, and provide proactive security against mobile adversaries.

1 Introduction


The Internet Computer hosts clusters of nodes running subnets (shards) that host finite state machines known as canisters (advanced smart contracts). The

Internet Computer Consensus

Assumption: n > 3f

Guarantees agreement even under asynchrony

Guarantees termination under partial synchrony



https://internetcomputer.org/how-it-works/consensus





Internet Computer Consensus

Jan Camenisch, Manu Drijvers, Timo Hanke, Yvonne-Anne Pignolet, Victor Shoup, Dominic William:

DFINITY Foundation

May 13, 2021


Abstract

We present the Internet Computer Consensus (ICC) family of protocols for atomic broadcast (a.k.a., consensus), which underpin the Byzantine fault-tolerant replicated state machines of the Internet Computer. The ICC protocols are leader-based protocols that assume partial synchrony, and that are fully integrated with a blockchain. The leader changes probabilistically in every round. These protocols are extremely simple and robust: in any round where the leader is corrupt (which itself happens with probability less than 1/3), each ICC protocol will effectively allow another party to take over as leader for that round, with very little fuss, to move the protocol forward to the next round in a timely fashion. Unlike in many other protocols, there are no complicated subprotocols (such as "view change" in PBFT) or unspecified subprotocols (such as "pacemaker" in HotStuff). Moreover, unlike in many other protocols (such as PBFT and HotStuff), the task of reliably disseminating the blocks to all parties is an integral part the protocol, and not left to some other unspecified subprotocol. An additional property enjoyed by the ICC protocols (just like PBFT and HotStuff, and unlike others, such as Tendermint) is *optimistic responsiveness*, which means that when the leader is honest, the protocol will proceed at the pace of the actual network delay, rather than some upper bound on the network delay. We present three different protocols (along with various minor variations on each). One of these protocols (ICC1) is designed to be integrated with a peer-to-peer gossip sub-layer, which reduces the bottleneck created at the leader for disseminating large blocks, a problem that all leader-based protocols, like PBFT and HotStuff, must address, but typically do not. Our Protocol ICC2 addresses the same problem by substituting a low-communication reliable broadcast subprotocol (which may be of independent interest) for the gossip sub-layer.

1 Introduction

Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) is the ability of a computing system to endure arbitrary (i.e., Byzantine) failures of some of its components while still functioning properly as a whole. One approach to achieving BFT is via state machine replication [Sch90]: the logic of the system is replicated across a number of machines, each of which maintains state, and updates its state is by executing a sequence of *commands*. In order to ensure that the non-faulty machines end up in the same state, they must each deterministically execute the same sequence of commands. This is achieved by using a protocol for *atomic broadcast*.







Network Nervous System (NNS)

<u>https://internetcomputer.org/nns</u>







Governance Ledger Registry

Cycle Minting Canister

(Plus a few others)











Subnet 1: Public key: , nodes: ... Subnet 2: Public key: , nodes: ...













Add subnet with public key and nodes ...


Subnets


Each canister is assigned to one subnet

Each subnet is a replicated state machine

• A canister can call canisters on other subnets

Subnets make the Internet Computer scalable!






Closer Look: Consensus





Consensus Properties



Block x+1 Block x+2 **Block** x

The following properties must hold even if up to f < n/3 nodes misbehave:


• Agreement (Safety): For any *i*, If two (honest) replicas think that the *i*th block is agreed upon, they must have the same block • Termination (Liveness): For any *i*, at some point every (honest) replica will think that the *i*th block is agreed upon • Validity: all agreed upon blocks are valid


Messages are placed in **blocks**. We reach agreement using a blockchain.



Neusen

Block Maker









• Message (user \rightarrow canister) • Message (canister \rightarrow canister)

otherwise the IC would not be fault tolerant!


A block maker selects available messages and combines them into a

We need more than one block maker in each round,

30



Block Maker Ranking




A sequence of unpredictable random bits (called the random beacon) is used to rank block makers:

	RB 24	RB 25	RB 26	RB 27
a 1	Replica 4	Replica 2	Replica 3	Replica 4
a 4	Replica 3	Replica 3	Replica 1	Replica 2
a 3	Replica 1	Replica 4	Replica 4	Replica 1
a 2	Replica 2	Replica 1	Replica 2	Replica 3

Round 26 Round 25

Round 27

Round 28




Round 29

Notarization

The notarization process ensures that a valid block proposal is published for every round


Step 1

Replica 1 receives a block proposal for height 30, building on some notarized height 29 block




Step 2

Replica 1 sees that the block is valid, signs it, and broadcasts its *notarization* share




Step 3

Replica 1 sees that replicas 3 and 4 also published their notarization shares on the block



Step 4

3 notarization shares are sufficient approval: the shares are aggregated into a single full notarization. Block 30 is now notarized, and notaries wait for height 31 blocks




Notarization

Replicas may notary-sign multiple blocks to ensure that at least one block becomes fully notarized


Step 1

Replica 1 receives a block proposal for height 30, building on some notarized height 29 block




Step 2

Replica 1 sees that the block is valid, signs it, and broadcasts its *notarization* share




Step 3

Replicas 1 sees another height 30 block, which is also valid, and it broadcasts another notarization share





Step 4

Both height 30 blocks get enough support to become notarized



Notarization with Block Maker Ranking








Multiple notarized blocks may exist at the same height!

One notarized block *b* at a height *h* = Agreement up to *h*


Finalization

Replicas create finalization shares if they did not sign any other block at that height




Replica 1 observes that block *b* is fully notarized and will no longer notary-sign blocks at height \leq 30

Step 2



Step 3


Since replica 1 did not notary-sign any other block than block b, it signs block *b*, creating a finalization-share on *b*



Replica 1 did not notary-sign any height 30 block other than b


Step 4

Replicas 2 and 4 also cast finalization shares on block *b*




Step 5


3 finalization-shares are sufficient approval: the shares are aggregated into a single full finalization



Finalization

Finalization on block b at height h = Proof that no other block is notarized at height h






The chain up to this block is final

Closer Look: HTTPS Outcalls





On-chain world



Smart contract



Interaction with Web 2.0

Smart contracts cannot access Web 2.0 resources directly!




Off-chain world







Interaction with Web 2.0 On-chain world 1) Request 6) Response Oracle smart contract




Smart contract



An oracle infrastructure is required. The oracles must be trusted!


Oracle service



Off-chain world

Interaction with Web 2.0 on the Internet Computer

On-chain world




 HTTPS requests & responses sent and received by replicas

Replicas can communicate with web servers directly (no intermediary!)

Responses go through consensus to ensure deterministic behavior



Off-chain world






The Internet Computer Today



Live Since May 2021!




https://dashboard.internetcomputer.org












Growing Blockchain Ecosystem







	Blog on web3 papy.rs	


https://internetcomputer.org/showcase




Internet Identity


identity.ic0.app













• • •	facebook/blenderbot-1B-distill	
Hi It is nice day.		
It is a r	nice day, but I wish it was a little warmer. I love the cooler wea	ather.
Yes. Me too. I lov	ve winter. how about you?	
I love i	it too.It's the best time of the year.What's your favorite season	1?
Talk to Al !		Send






Many Distributed Systems Problems

- Disseminating messages among nodes in the same subset
- Disseminating messages between subnets
- Scheduling and concurrent execution of canister messages
- Enabling nodes to catch up Guaranteeing consistency Upgrading to next protocol version
- Handling churn (adding/removing nodes)

- Creating new subnets
- Load balancing



Validation data

TXs per second

Finality

1 block / 10 minutes


Average block time


Internet Computer vs....





440 GB





1 block / 15 seconds



15





48 bytes

30,000 (write) 2,000,000 (read)

1-3 seconds

37 blocks / second

More information

Infographic: <u>https://internetcomputer.org/icig.pdf</u>

- Technical Library:



https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLuhDt1vhGcrfHG_rnRKsqZO1jL_Pd970h (videos) https://medium.com/dfinity (blogposts)

200,000,000 CHF Developer Grant Program: <u>https://dfinity.org/grants/</u>

DFINITY SDK: <u>https://internetcomputer.org/docs/current/developer-docs/build/</u>



