Blockchains Cannot Rely on Honesty

Submission 43

ABSTRACT

This work proposes a novel blockchain with incentive scheme such that following the protocol is guaranteed to be the optimal strategy. Our blockchain takes the form of a directed acyclic graph, resulting in improvements with respect to throughput and speed.

More importantly, for our blockchain to function, it is not expected that the miners conform to some presupposed protocol in the interest of the system’s operability. Instead, our system works if miners act selfishly, trying to get the maximum possible rewards, with no consideration for the overall health of the blockchain.

To the best of our knowledge, our design is the first blockchain to tolerate a majority of rational instead of a majority of honest miners.

ACM Reference Format:

1 INTRODUCTION

A decade ago, Satoshi Nakamoto presented his now famous Bitcoin protocol [10]. Nakamoto assembled some stimulating techniques in an attractive package, such that the result was more than just the sum of its parts.

The Bitcoin blockchain promises to order and store transactions meticulously, despite being anarchistic, “without a trusted party”. Literally anybody can participate, as long as “honest nodes collectively control more CPU power than any cooperating group of attacker nodes” [10].

In Section 6 of his seminal paper, Nakamoto argues that it is rational to be honest thanks to block rewards and fees. However, it turns out that Nakamoto was overly optimistic, and rational does not imply honest. If a miner has a fast network and/or a significant fraction of the hashing power, the miner may be better off by not being honest, holding blocks back instead of immediately broadcasting them to the network [2].

If the material costs and payoffs of mining are low, one can argue that the majority of miners will want to remain honest. After all, if too many miners stop conforming to the protocol, the system will break down. However, the costs and payoffs of participation vary over time, and majority of miners remaining altruistic is never guaranteed. Strategies outperforming the protocol may or may not be discovered for different blockchain incentive designs. However, as long as it is not proven that no such sophisticated strategy exists, the system remains in jeopardy.

Our Contribution. We propose a blockchain design with an incentive scheme guaranteeing that deviating from the protocol strictly reduces the amount and overall share of rewards. Our approach is to ensure that creating a fork will always be detrimental to all parties involved. Our design allows blocks to reference more than one previous block; in other words, the blocks form a directed acyclic graph (DAG). We prove that miners creating a new block have an incentive to always reference all previously unreferenced blocks. Hence, all blocks are recorded in the blockchain and no blocks are discarded.

2 MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES

2.1 Rounds

Communication between players (miners) is divided into rounds. Each round consists of each player: 1) computing (mining) new blocks, 2) sending newly found blocks to all other players, 3) receiving all messages before the next round commences. The length of one round can be thought of as a network delay.

2.2 Players

To avoid confusion in how we build on previous work, we stick to the usual terminology of honest players and an adversary. The players that conform to the protocol are called honest. A coalition of all parties that considers deviating from the protocol is controlled by an adversary. We gradually introduce new elements, and eventually show that by deviating from the protocol, the adversary reduces its share and amount of rewards. Hence, rational becomes synonymous with honest.

The adversary constitutes a minority as described in Section 2.5, otherwise the adversary can take over the blockchain by simply ignoring all actions by honest players. The adversary is also more powerful than honest players. First of all, we consider the adversary as a single entity. The adversary does not have to send messages to itself, so the mine/send/receive order within a round does not apply to the adversary. Moreover, the adversary gets to see all messages sent by honest players in round $r$ before deciding its strategy of round $r$. After seeing the honest messages, the adversary is not allowed to create new blocks again in this round. Moreover, the adversary controls the order that messages arrive to each player.

2.3 Blocks

Blocks are a type of message that the players exchange, and a basic unit of the blockchain. Formally, a block $B$ is a tuple $B = (T_B, R_B, c, \eta)$, where:

- $T_B$ is the content of the block
- $R_B$ is a set of references (hashes) to previously existing blocks, i.e. $R_B = \{h(B_1), \ldots, h(B_m)\}$
- $c$ is an address of the player that created the block

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• \( \eta \) is the proof-of-work nonce, i.e., a number such that for a hash function \( h \) and difficulty parameter \( D \), \( h(\eta) < D \) holds.

The content of the block \( T_B \) depends on the application. In general, \( T_B \) contains some information that the block creator wishes to record in the blockchain for all participants to see. We consider blockchain properties independently of the content \( T_B \). The content \( T_B \) is briefly discussed in Section 5.2.

The creator of \( B \) holds the private key for the address \( c \). The creator can later use the key to withdraw the reward for creating \( B \). The amount of reward is automatically determined by the protocol, and at the core of our contribution in Section 5.

2.4 DAG

\( R_B \) includes at least one hash of a previous block, which might be the hash of a special genesis block \((0, 0, \perp, 0)\). The hash function is pre-image resistant, i.e., it is infeasible to find a message given its hash. If a block \( B' \) includes a reference to another block \( B \), \( B' \) must include \( h(B) \), and hence has to be created after \( B \).

A directed cycle of blocks is impossible, as the block which was created earliest in such a cycle cannot include a hash to the other blocks that were created later. Consequently, the blocks always form a directed acyclic graph (DAG) with the genesis block as the only root (block without any parent) of this DAG.

2.5 Mining

Creating a new block is achieved by varying \( \eta \) to find a hash value that is smaller than the difficulty parameter \( D \), i.e., \( h(\eta) < D \). Creating blocks in this way is called mining. Blocks are called honest if mined by an honest player, or adversarial if mined by the adversary.

By varying \( D \), the protocol designer can set the probability of mining a block with a single hashing query arbitrarily. The difficulty \( D \) could also change during the execution of the protocol to adjust the rate at which blocks are created. For simplicity and clarity we leave the details of changing \( D \) to future work, and assume \( D \) to be constant.

The computational power of the adversary is such that the expected number of blocks the adversary can mine in one round is equal to \( \beta \). The adversary does not experience a delay in communication with itself, so the adversary might mine multiple blocks forming a chain in one round. The honest players control the computational power to mine \( \alpha \) blocks in expectation in one round. Because of the delay in communication, the effective computational power of the honest players corresponds to the probability \( \alpha' \approx e^{-\alpha} \) [5] that in a given round exactly one honest player mines a block.

Throughout the paper we assume:\(^1\)

1. The honest players have more mining power: \( \alpha' \geq \beta(1 + \epsilon) \)
   for a constant \( \epsilon > 0 \).
2. The difficulty \( D \) is set such that the expected number of blocks mined within one round is less than one: \( \alpha + \beta < 1 \).

3 THE PROTOCOL

The protocol by which the honest players construct the block DAG is quite natural:

• Every round, attempt to mine new blocks.
• Reference in \( R_B \) all unreferenced blocks observed.
• Broadcast newly mined blocks to all other players immediately.
• Newly received blocks are also sent to all players.\(^2\)

4 THE BLOCK DAG

Each player stores the DAG formed by all blocks known to the player. For each block \( B \), one of the referenced blocks \( B_i \) is the parent \( B_i = P(B) \), and \( B \) is the child of \( P(B) \). The parent is automatically determined based on the DAG structure. The parent-child edges induce the parent tree from the DAG.

The players use Algorithm 4 (proposed by [15]) to select a chain of blocks going from the genesis block to a leaf in the parent tree. The selected chain represents the current state of the blockchain; it is called the main chain. The main chain of a player changes from round to round. Players adopt main chains that may be different from each other, depending on the blocks observed.

Algorithm 1: Main chain selection algorithm.

\begin{algorithm}
\begin{algorithmic}[1]
\State \textbf{Input:} a block tree \( T \)
\State \textbf{Output:} block \( B \) - the end of the selected chain
\State \( B \leftarrow \text{genesis} \) \hfill \Comment{start at the genesis block.}
\While{\( B \) has a child in \( T \)}
\State \( B \leftarrow \text{heaviest child of} \ B \) \Comment{continue with the child of} \( B \) \Comment{with most nodes in its subtree.}
\EndWhile
\State \textbf{return} \( B \)
\end{algorithmic}
\end{algorithm}

Let \( past(B) \) denote the set of blocks reachable by references from \( B \) and the DAG formed by those blocks. The protocol dictates referencing all blocks that otherwise would not be included in \( past(B) \). Then, by creating a new block \( B \), the creator communicates only being aware of blocks in \( past(B) \). Based on \( past(B) \), we determine \( P(B) \) as the end of the main chain (Algorithm ) of the DAG of the player when creating a new block \( B \) [6].

\textbf{Definition 1.} A block \( B \) is the child of the block returned by Algorithm 4 in the parent tree of \( past(B) \).

Lemma 2, proven by [5], encapsulates the notion that a blockchain (represented by the parent tree in our description) functions properly with respect to a basic requirement. Intuitively, it states that from any point in time, the longer one waits, the more probable it becomes that some honest block mined after that point in time is contained in a main chain of each honest player. The probability of the contrary decreases exponentially with time.

\(^{1}\)The following assumptions are made in order to satisfy the prerequisites of Lemma 2, which links our work to traditional blockchains. Intuitively, Lemma 2 states that a traditional blockchain works with respect to the most basic requirement. If one believes a blockchain to function in this basic way under some other assumptions, those assumptions can be used instead, and our results would apply in the same way.

\(^{2}\)One may wonder why this is needed, since honest players send their blocks to all players anyway. However, the adversary may decide not to do that, and this statement helps that adversarial blocks are seen by all players at most one round after the first honest player has seen the block. This technique is generally known as reliable broadcast.
Lemma 2 (Fresh Block Lemma). For all \( r, \Delta \in \mathbb{N} \), with probability \( 1 - e^{-2\Omega(\Delta)} \), there exists a block mined by an honest player on or after round \( r \) that is contained in the main chain of each honest player on and after round \( r + \Delta \).

Lemma 2 can be proved with respect to other chain selection rules, for instance picking the child with the longest chain instead of the heaviest child as in Algorithm 4. Our work can be applied equally well using such chain selection rules.

Algorithm 2: Order(B): a total order of blocks in past(B).

Input: a block \( B \)
Output: a total order of all blocks in past(B)
1 On the first invocation, \( \text{visited}(\cdot) \) is initialized to false for each block.
2 if \( \text{visited}(B) \) then return \( \emptyset \)
3 \( \text{visited}(B) \leftarrow \text{true} \) // Blocks are visited depth-first.
4 if \( B = \text{genesis} \) then return \( B \)
5 \( O \leftarrow \text{Order}(\text{past}(B)) \)
   // Get the order of \( P(B) \) recursively.
6 for \( i = 1, \ldots, m \) do
7   \( O \leftarrow O.\text{append}(\text{Order}(B_i)) \)
8 \( O \leftarrow O.\text{append}(B) \)  // Append newly included blocks.
9 return \( O \)

4.1 Block Order

We will now explain, how all blocks reachable by references will be ordered, following the algorithm of [6]. According to the resulting order, the contents of blocks that fall outside of the main chain can be processed, as if all blocks formed one chain.

Definition 3. Each player processes blocks in the order Order(B), where \( B \) is the last block of the main chain.

Algorithm 3: Compute \( S_B \).

Input: a block \( B \)
Output: a set \( S_B \)
1 if \( B = \text{genesis} \) then return \( \emptyset \)
2 \( S \leftarrow S_{P(B)} \) // Copy \( S_{P(B)} \) for blocks in past(P(B)).
3 for \( A \in \text{past}(B) \setminus \text{past}(P(B)) \) do
4   \( X = \text{LCA}(A, B) \)
5   \( \text{Age} = D(X, B) \) // age = distance from \( B \) to LCA.
6   if \( \text{Age} > p \) then
7     \( S = S \cup \{A\} \)  // Append \( B \) at the end.
8 return \( S \)

Corollary 6. All announced blocks are eventually referenced in the main chains of honest players.

4.2 Stale Blocks

We now introduce a mechanism to distinguish blocks that were announced within a reasonable number of rounds from blocks that were withheld by the miner for an extended period of time.

We call \( P(B) \) the \( \text{ith} \) ancestor of \( B \) and \( B \) is a descendant of \( P(B) \). By LCA(\( B_1, B_2 \)) we denote the block that is an ancestor of \( B_1 \) and an ancestor of \( B_2 \), such that none of its children are simultaneously an ancestor of \( B_1 \) and an ancestor of \( B_2 \).

For blocks \( A \) and \( B \), \( D(A, B) \) is the distance between \( A \) and \( B \) in the parent tree, i.e. \( D(A, P(A)) = 1, D(A, P(P(A))) = 2, \) etc.

Algorithm 3 computes a sets of blocks \( S_B \), and \( S_B = \text{past}(B) \setminus \text{past}(B) \). If \( A \in S_B \) we call \( A \) stale.

We introduce a constant \( p \) chosen by the protocol designer. Given a main chain ending with block \( B \) including another block \( A \), we judge \( A \) by the distance one needs to backtrack along the main chain to find an ancestor of \( A \). If the distance exceeds \( p \), \( A \) is stale.

Algorithm 4: Compute \( S_B \).

Input: a block \( B \)
Output: a set \( S_B \)
1 if \( B = \text{genesis} \) then return \( \emptyset \)
2 \( S \leftarrow S_{P(B)} \) // Copy \( S_{P(B)} \) for blocks in past(P(B)).
3 for \( A \in \text{past}(B) \setminus \text{past}(P(B)) \) do
4   \( X = \text{LCA}(A, B) \)
5   \( \text{Age} = D(X, B) \) // age = distance from \( B \) to LCA.
6   if \( \text{Age} > p \) then
7     \( S = S \cup \{A\} \)  // Append \( A \) at the end.
8 return \( S \)

Corollary 7. If \( A \in \text{past}(P(B)) \) then \( A \in S_B \iff A \in S_{P(B)} \).

Proof. Line 5 in Algorithm 3 sets \( S_B \) the same as \( S_{P(B)} \), while the following FOR loop adds only blocks \( A \notin \text{past}(P(B)) \).

Theorem 8 shows that the probability of honest blocks being labeled stale is negligible.

Theorem 8 (Honest Blocks Are Not Stale). Let \( B \) be an honest block mined on round \( r \). With probability \( 1 - e^{-\Omega(\Delta)} \), after round \( r + O(p) \) each honest player \( H \) adopts a main chain ending with a block \( B_H \) such that \( B \in S_{B_H} \).

Proof. Let \( \Delta = \left[ \frac{p}{2^{(\alpha + \beta)k+1}} \right] = O(p) \). By Lemma 2, with probability \( 1 - e^{-\Omega(\Delta)} \), on and after round \( r \), honest players have adopted main chains containing a block \( C \) mined between rounds \( r - \Delta \) and \( r \) (or the genesis block if \( r - \Delta \) < 1). Hence \( C \) is an ancestor of \( B \). By Lemma 2, let \( D \) be the honest block mined between rounds \( r + 1 \) and \( r + \Delta + 1 \) that honest players adopted in the main chain on and after round \( r + \Delta + 1 \), again with probability \( 1 - e^{-\Omega(\Delta)} \), \( D \) is honest and mined after round \( r \), so \( B \in \text{past}(D) \).
Since C was mined on or after round \( r - \Delta \), and D was mined on or before round \( r + \Delta + 1 \), D(C, D) is at most the number \( Y \) of blocks mined between rounds \( r - \Delta \) and \( r + \Delta + 1 \). By the Chernoff bound:
\[
\frac{e^{-\frac{\varepsilon^2 (\alpha + \beta)(2\Delta + 1)}{3}}}{\varepsilon^2} \geq \Pr[|Y - (1 + \varepsilon)(\alpha + \beta)(2\Delta + 1)| \geq \varepsilon |Y|] \geq \Pr[|Y| \geq p]
\]
Since \( C \) is an ancestor of \( D \), \( C \) is an ancestor of \( LCA(B, D) \), and \( D(C, D) \geq D(LCA(B, D), D) \). By Algorithm 3:
\[
D(C, D) < p \implies B \in \hat{S}_D.
\]
By union bound, the probability that such \( C \) and \( D \) exist and that \( B \in \hat{S}_D \) is at least equal
\[
1 - 2e^{-\Omega(\Delta)} - e^{-\frac{2\varepsilon^2 (\alpha + \beta)(2\Delta + 1)}{3}} = 1 - e^{-\Omega(p)}.
\]
By Corollary 7 and induction, with probability \( 1 - e^{-\Omega(p)} \), after round \( r + \Delta \) all honest players adopt only chains ending with blocks \( X \) such that \( B \in \hat{S}_X \). \( \square \)

5 THE REWARD SCHEME

Consider coupling the presented protocol with a reward mechanism \( R^0 \) granting some flat amount \( b \) of reward to all non-stale blocks. \( R^0 \) is a special case of the reward scheme defined in Definition 11.

Note that \( R^0 \) achieves the same fairness guarantee as the Fruitchains protocol to be discussed in Section 6.3 — honest blocks are incorporated into the blockchain as non-stale, while withholding a block for too long makes it lose its reward potential. Both protocols rely on the honest majority of participants to guarantee this fairness.

The Fruitchains protocol relies critically on merged-mining [11] (also called 2-for-1 POW [3]) fruits and blocks. While fruits are mined for the rewards, blocks are supposed to be mined entirely voluntarily with negligible extra cost. \( R^0 \) avoids this complication.

Granting flat amount of reward for each non-stale block leaves a lot of room for deviation that goes unpunished. In the case of the Fruitchains protocol, mining blocks does not contribute rewards in any way. Hence, any deviation with respect to mining blocks (which decide the order of contents) is free of any cost for the adversary. In the context of cryptocurrency transactions, a rational adversary should always attempt to double-spend.

In the case of \( R^0 \), the adversary can refrain from referencing some recent blocks, and suffer no penalty. However, attempting to manipulate the order of older blocks would render the adversary’s new block stale, and hence penalize.

5.1 Penalizing Deviations

Central to our design is the approach to treating forks i.e. blocks that “compete” by referencing the same parent block but not each other. Typically, blockchain schemes specify that one of the blocks eventually ‘loses’ and the creator misses out on some rewards, hence discouraging the competition. However, there are ways of manipulating this process to one’s advantage, and the uncertainty of which block will win the competition introduces unneeded incentives. We penalize all parties involved in creating a fork.

Definition 9 introduces the conflict set. From the perspective of a main chain ending with a block \( A \), the conflict set of a non-stale block \( B \) contains all non-stale blocks \( X \) that are not reachable by references from \( B \), and \( B \) is not reachable by references from \( X \).

Definition 9 (Conflict Set). For blocks \( A \) and \( B \) where \( B \in \hat{S}_A \), \( X_A(B) = \{ X : X \in past(A) \land X \in \hat{S}_A \land X \notin past(B) \land B \notin past(X) \} \).

Lemma 10. Let \( x \geq p \) and \( B \) be a block. The probability that any honest player adopts a main chain ending with a block \( A \) such that \( |X_A(B)| > xp \) is \( e^{-\Omega(x)} \).

Proof. Let \( r \) be the round \( B \) was announced. Let \( P_i, i \in \{1, \ldots, 2p\} \) (respectively \( F_i \), \( i \in \{1, \ldots, p\} \)), be an honest block mined between rounds \( r - \frac{4}{3} - 1 \) and \( r - \frac{2(p+1)}{3} - 1 \) (resp. \( r + \frac{4}{3} - 1 \) and \( r + \frac{2p+1}{3} + 1 \)) contained in the main chain of every honest player on and after round \( r + \frac{2p+1}{3} + 1 \); by Lemma 2 and union bound such blocks exist with probability \( 1 - e^{-\Omega(x)} \).

Since \( F_i \) is honest, \( B \in past(F_i) \). By Algorithm 3, if \( P_p \notin past(B) \), then \( F_i \in S_{F_i} \) and \( X_A(B) \) remains undefined for honest players. Otherwise, assume \( P_p \notin past(B) \).

Let \( Z \) be a block such that \( Z \notin past(B) \land B \notin past(Z) \). Since \( Z \notin past(B) \), \( Z \not\subseteq past(P_p) \). By Algorithm 3, either \( P_{2p} \notin past(Z) \), or \( Z \) becomes stale in the main chains of honest players from round \( r = \frac{2(p+1)}{3} + 1 \). Assume \( P_{2p} \equiv past(Z) \), and hence \( Z \) is mined on or after round \( r = \frac{2p+1}{3} + 1 \).

Therefore, \( Z \in X_A(B) \) implies that \( Z \) is mined between rounds \( r - \frac{2p+1}{3} - 1 \) and \( r + \frac{2p+1}{3} + 1 \). Let \( Y \) be the number of blocks mined between these rounds. By Chernoff bound:
\[
Pr[Y \geq xp] \leq Pr[Y \geq \frac{4}{3}(\alpha + \beta)(\frac{3xp}{4} + 2)] = e^{-\Omega(x)}.
\]

Note the bound is applicable to any main chain of an honest player before round \( r + \frac{2p+1}{3} + 1 \) as well. The claim follows from the union bound. \( \square \)

Definition 11 (Rewards). \( R_{c,b} \) is a rewards scheme whereby given a block \( A \), each block \( B \in past(A) \) is granted \( R_{c,b}(B) \) amount of reward:
\[
R_{c,b}(B) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } B \in S_A \text{ or } D(A, LCA(A, B)) \leq 2p. \\ b - c[X_A(B)], & \text{otherwise}. \end{cases}
\]

We write \( R^c \) for \( R_{c,b} \) if \( b \) is clear from context, or just \( R \) if \( c \) is clear from context.

Lemma 12. If \( D(P(A), LCA(P(A), B)) > 2p \) then \( X_A(B) = X_{P(A)}(B) \).

Proof. From Definition 9, \( X_{P(A)}(B) \subseteq X_A(B) \). Suppose for contradiction \( \exists Y : Y \in X_{A}(B) \setminus X_{P(A)}(B) \). From Definition 9, \( B \in \hat{S}_A \), therefore \( B \in past(P(A)) \). Hence, \( P(A) \notin past(Y) \). Since \( Y \notin past(P(A)) \), \( D(A, LCA(A, Y)) > p \) and \( Y \in S_A \), a contradiction. \( \square \)

Corollary 13 (Rewards Are Final).
\[
\forall B \in past(A) : R_{P(A)}(B) \neq 0 \implies R_A(B) = R_{P(A)}(B).
\]

Proof. \( R_{c,b}^{P(A)}(B) \) is non-zero only if \( D(A, LCA(A, B)) > 2p \). The corollary follows from Lemmas 7 and 12 and induction. \( \square \)
Corollary 14 (Rewards Are Non-Negative). Let $B$ be a block. The probability that any honest player adopts a main chain ending with a block $A$ such that $R_{A}^{c,b}(B) < 0$ is $\epsilon^{-\Omega\left(\frac{cp}{b}\right)}$.

Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 10. □

Theorem 15. Any deviation from the protocol reduces the adversary’s rewards and its proportion of rewards $R_{A}^{c,b}(B)$ with probability $1 - \epsilon^{-\Omega\left(p\right)} - \epsilon^{-\Omega\left(\frac{cp}{b}\right)}$.

Proof. With probability $1 - \epsilon^{-\Omega\left(p\right)}$ honest blocks are not-stale (Theorem 8). With probability $1 - \epsilon^{-\Omega\left(\frac{cp}{b}\right)}$ block rewards are final and non-negative (Corollaries 13 and 14). Hence, eventual value of $R_{A}^{c,b}(B)$ depends only on $|X_{A}(B)|$.

Referencing all blocks and immediately announcing new blocks $B$ minimizes $|X_{A}(B)|$. Note $Y \in X_{A}(Z) \iff Z \in X_{A}(Y)$, so by increasing $|X_{A}(B)|$ the adversary can only reduce the rewards of honest players (by $c|X_{A}(B)|$) if the adversary forfeits the same amount. Since the adversary constitutes a minority, its proportion of rewards decreases as well. □

Theorem 15 shows that minimizing the conflict set of mined blocks is always in the interest of the miner. Notice that following the protocol is the unique strategy minimizing the conflict set of created blocks. There are negligibly improbable scenarios in which a player can gain by deviating, and committing to a strategy different from the protocol carries definite costs. Hence, the constants can be set so that the unique Nash-equilibrium of the game is all players conforming to the protocol.

However, if the adversary wishes to spend resources solely to influence the behaviour of rational miners, there might always be ways such as bribery (see Section 6.4).

5.2 Block Content and Transaction Fees

Depending on the use of the blockchain, miners can be rewarded for including contents in their blocks in various ways. Typically, a transaction fee is awarded to only one miner that first includes the transaction in a block. As a result, the order of processing blocks is important for determining who collects the fees, as it indicates which block is the first. Problematic incentives are introduced with respect to manipulating the order.

Any particular fee-sharing scheme cannot be enforced, because the fee might be disregarded from a regular transaction output paid to the miner directly. This can benefit both the transaction issuer and the miner, incentivizing the behavior.\(^5\)

To be incentive compatible, it is not necessary that the fees are spread proportionally. What we want is that the miners never have an incentive to omit a reference to another block. As all blocks are assumed to eventually be included in the blockchain, it is enough to ensure that sufficiently small changes of the linearized order of the blocks have no effect on the miner rewards. This can be achieved by allowing multiple blocks to claim the same inclusion of contents, and having the fee be shared among the including blocks equally.

\(^5\)If we disregard this vulnerability, the same fee-sharing approach as employed by the Fruitchains protocol can be applied to our work.

In other words, any player who wishes to include a transaction can do so within a certain window, without an effect on their incentives to reference other blocks. Crucially, sending the fee directly to a miner as a transaction output removes the incentive for other miners to include the transaction, as well as the incentive to manipulate the place of the including block in the order.

The point of such a change would be to separate transaction inclusion from referencing blocks. Transaction inclusion is a complex game in itself, similar to the game studied by [6].

6 RELATED WORK

The model of round-based communication in the setting of blockchain was introduced in [3]. This paper formalizes and studies the security of Bitcoin.

6.1 Selfish Mining

Selfish mining is a branch of research studying a type of strategies increasing the proportion of rewards obtained by players in a Bitcoin-like system. Selfish mining exemplifies concerns stemming from the lack of proven incentive compatibility. Selfish mining was first described formally in [2], although the idea had been discussed earlier [9]. Selfish mining strategies have been improved [14] and generalized [12].

6.2 DAG

The way we order all blocks for the purpose of processing them was introduced in [6]. The authors consider an incentive scheme to accompany this modification. Their design relies on altruism, as referring extra blocks has no benefit, other than to creators of referred blocks. Hence, rational miners would never refer them, possibly degenerating the DAG to a blockchain similar to Bitcoin’s. Some other shortcomings are discussed by the authors.

The authors of [7] contribute an experimental implementation of the directed acyclic graph structure and ordering of [6], in particular its advantages with respect to the throughput.

6.3 Fruitchains

Fruitchains [13] is probably the closest work to ours, its discussion deserves its own section. Fruitchains is a protocol that gives a guarantee that miners are rewarded somewhat proportionally to their mining power. The objective might seem similar to ours, but there are fundamental differences. To achieve fairness, similarly to existing solutions, the Fruitchains protocol requires that majority of miners are honest. In other words, in order to contribute to the common good of the system, players must put in altruistic work.

In contrast, we strive for a protocol such that any miner simply trying to maximize their share or amount of rewards will inadvertently conform to the protocol.

The Fruitchains protocol rewards mining of “fruits”, which are a kind of blocks that do not contribute to the security of the system. The Fruitchains protocol relies on merged-mining\(^6\) also called 2-for-1 PoW in [3]. In addition to fruits, the miners can mine “normal” blocks (containing the fruits) for a minimal extra effort and no

\(^6\)One of the first mentions of merged-mining as used today is [11], although the general idea was mentioned as early as [4].
reward. The functioning and security of the system depends on majority of miners mining normals blocks according to the protocol.

Miners are asked to reference the fruits of other miners, benefitting others but not themselves, similarly to [inclusive]. The probability of not doing so having any effect is negligible, since majority of the miners are still assumed to reference said fruits.

The resulting system-wide cooperation guarantees fairness, inevitably removing many game-theoretic aspects from the resulting game. In particular, misbehaviour does not result in any punishment. It is common to analyze blockchain designs with respect to the expected cost of a double-spend attempt. In the case of Fruitchains, while the probability of double-spend being successful is similar to previous designs, the cost of attempting to double-spend is nullified. As a result, any miner might attempt to double-spend constantly at no cost, which we view as a serious jeopardy to the system.

In the absence of punishments, we also argue that not conforming to the protocol is often simpler. Since transaction fees are shared between miners, including transactions might be seen as pointless altogether. Mining only fruits with dummy, zero-fee transactions, while not including the fruits of others (or not mining for blocks altogether), would relieve the miner of a vast majority of the network communication.

Another game-theoretic issue of the Fruitchains protocol is that while it prescribes sharing of the transaction fees, miners might ask transaction issuers to disguise the fee as an additional transaction output, locking it to a specific miner, potentially benefiting both parties and disrupting the protocol.

In contrast to Fruitchains protocol, our approach is to employ purely economic forces, clearly incentivizing desired behaviour while making sure that deviations are punished.

6.4 Bribery

Recently, there have been works highlighting the problems of bribery, e.g. [1, 8]. A bribing attacker might temporarily convince some otherwise honest players (either using threats or incentives) to join the adversary. Consequently, the adversary might gain more than half of the computational power, taking over the system temporarily.

Such bribery might be completely external to the reward scheme itself, for example the adversary might program a smart contract (even in another blockchain) that provably offers rewards to miners that show they deviate from the protocol. Hence, no permissionless blockchain can be safe against this type of attack.

We showed that our design is tolerant to miners acting rationally, trying to get the maximum possible rewards, with no consideration for the overall health of the blockchain.

To the best of our knowledge, our design is the first to provably allow for rational mining. Nakamoto [10] needed “honest nodes collectively control more CPU power than any cooperating group of attacker nodes”. With our design it is possible to turn the word honest into the word rational.

REFERENCES