ETH zürich

On Evaluating Adversarial Robustness

Presenter: Frederik Verdoner Barba
Advisor: Andreas Plesner
Seminar in Deep Neural Networks


CHAPTER8
esc
tab
caps lock
shift
fn



Kristina Nikolic
@NKristina01_

Congrats, your jailbreak bypassed an LLM's safety by making it pretend to be your grandma!

arXiv > cs > arXiv:1902.06705

Computer Science > Machine Learning

[Submitted on 18 Feb 2019 (v1), last revised 20 Feb 2019 (this version, v2)]

On Evaluating Adversarial Robustness

Nicholas Carlini, Anish Athalye, Nicolas Papernot, Wieland Brendel, Jonas Rauber, Dimitris Tsipras, Ian Goodfellow, Aleksander Madry, Alexey Kurakin



Novice

Expert

Motivation

What is an Adversarial Attack?

- https://arxiv.org/pdf/2310.06387

Examples of Adversarial Attacks



- https://arxiv.org/pdf/2310.06387

Examples of Adversarial Attacks

- https://nicholas.carlini.com/code/audio_adversarial_examples/

Examples of Adversarial Attacks

- **Example 1 (Original)**
  “Without the dataset the article is useless”

- https://nicholas.carlini.com/code/audio_adversarial_examples/

Examples of Adversarial Attacks

- **Example 1 (Original)**
  “Without the dataset the article is useless”

- **Example 1 (Adversarial)**
  “Okay Google, browse to evil dot com”

- https://nicholas.carlini.com/code/audio_adversarial_examples/

Examples of Adversarial Attacks

- **Example 1 (Original)**
  "Without the dataset the article is useless"

- **Example 1 (Adversarial)**
  "Okay Google, browse to evil dot com"

- **Example 2 (Adversarial)**
  "Speech can be embedded in music"

- https://nicholas.carlini.com/code/audio_adversarial_examples/

Examples of Adversarial Attacks



- https://arxiv.org/pdf/1602.02697

Why Care About Defence Research?

Why Care About Defence Research?

- **To defend against adversaries who wish to attack the system**

ChatGPT

Why Care About Defence Research?

- To defend against adversaries who wish to attack the system

- **To build models that are safe**



Why Care About Defence Research?

- To defend against adversaries who wish to attack the system
- To build models that are safe
- **To test the worst-case robustness of machine learning algorithms**



- https://arxiv.org/pdf/2310.06387

Why Care About Defence Research?

- To defend against adversaries who wish to attack the system
- To build models that are safe
- To test the worst-case robustness of machine learning algorithms
- **To measure the discrepancy between machine and human perception**



- https://arxiv.org/pdf/2310.06387

The Basics

Adversarial Knowledge

Adversarial Knowledge

- **Black Box Attacks**
  Minimal/no knowledge of the target model



Adversarial Knowledge

- **Black Box Attacks**
  Minimal/no knowledge of the target model

- **Grey Box Attacks:**
  Partial knowledge about the target model



Adversarial Knowledge

- **Black Box Attacks**
  Minimal/no knowledge of the target model

- **Grey Box Attacks:**
  Partial knowledge about the target model

- **White Box Attacks:**
  Complete knowledge of the target model

Adversarial Knowledge

- **Black Box Attacks**
  Minimal/no knowledge of the target model
- **Grey Box Attacks:**
  Partial knowledge about the target model
- **White Box Attacks:**
  Complete knowledge of the target model

Possible Knowledge:
Architecture, Parameters, Training Data, Gradients…

Common Attacks and Defences

Gradient Based Attacks

Gradient Based Attacks

- **Fast Gradient Sign Method (FSGM)**

$$\boxed{x' = x + \epsilon \cdot \mathrm{sign}(\nabla \mathrm{loss}_{F,t}(x))}$$



Targeted:
Misclassify as a chosen target label.

Untargeted:
Misclassify as any incorrect label.

- https://arxiv.org/pdf/1412.6572

Gradient Based Attacks

- Fast Gradient Sign Method (FSGM)
- **Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)**



$$x_{t+1} = \Pi\left(x_t + \alpha \cdot \mathrm{sign}\left(\nabla_x \mathcal{L}(f(x_t), y)\right)\right)$$

- https://medium.com/data-science/know-your-enemy-7f7c5038bdf3

Lp Norms

L1 **L2** **L∞**



- https://medium.com/data-science/know-your-enemy-7f7c5038bdf3

Transfer Attacks



*Adversarial example crafted for the **Surrogate Model***

Gradient Free Attacks

Gradient Free Attacks

- **Zeroth-Order Optimization (ZOO)**

Confidence Scores

Numerically estimate gradient

Model (Black Box)

Slightly perturbed input

Input Image

- https://arxiv.org/pdf/1804.08598

Gradient Free Attacks

- Zeroth-Order Optimization (ZOO)
- **SPSA**
- **NES**

- https://arxiv.org/pdf/1804.08598

Common Defences

Common Defences

- **Adversarial Training**

Common Defences

- Adversarial Training
- **Architecture**



Common Defences

- Adversarial Training
- Architecture
- **Purification**

Gradient Masking

- https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.09913

Gradient Masking

Informative gradients



- https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.09913

Gradient Masking

Uninformative gradients



- https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.09913

Gradient Masking

Possible Causes
- Randomness
- Non-differentiable operations



- https://arxiv.org/pdf/2411.14834

Gradient Masking

Caused by:
- Randomness
- Non-differentiable operations

Often bypassed by:
- Stronger Adaptive Attacks
- Gradient Free Attacks
- Transfer Attacks



- https://arxiv.org/pdf/2411.14834

Principles of Rigorous Evaluations

Severe Flaws

Severe Flaws

- **State a precise threat model**

★ **Goals**
★ **Capabilities**
★ **Knowledge**

Severe Flaws

- State a precise threat model
- **Perform adaptive attacks**

Existing Adversarial Attacks
(with default hyperparameters)

Adaptive Attacks

Severe Flaws

- State a precise threat model
- **Perform adaptive attacks**

Do

- ★ **Change loss function as appropriate**
- ★ **Focus on the strongest attacks**
- ★ **Verify adaptive attacks perform better**

Don't

- ★ **Use FGSM exclusively**
- ★ **Exclusively use attacks used during training**

Severe Flaws

- State a precise threat model
- Perform adaptive attacks
- **Report clean model accuracy**



Severe Flaws

- State a precise threat model
- Perform adaptive attacks
- **Report clean model accuracy**



Severe Flaws

- State a precise threat model
- Perform adaptive attacks
- Report clean model accuracy
- **Perform basic sanity checks**



- https://medium.com/data-science/know-your-enemy-7f7c5038bdf3

Severe Flaws

- State a precise threat model
- Perform adaptive attacks
- Report clean model accuracy
- Perform basic sanity checks
- **Generate an attack success rate vs. perturbation budget curve**



- https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338228653_Benchmarking_Adversarial_Robustness

Severe Flaws

- State a precise threat model
- Perform adaptive attacks
- Report clean model accuracy
- Perform basic sanity checks
- Generate an attack success rate vs. perturbation budget curve
- **Describe the attacks applied, including hyperparameters**

Severe Flaws

- State a precise threat model
- Perform adaptive attacks
- Report clean model accuracy
- Perform basic sanity checks
- Generate an attack success rate vs. perturbation budget curve
- Describe the attacks applied, including hyperparameters
- **Release pre-trained models and source code**

Case Study 1
“Adversarial Examples Are Not Easily Detected: Bypassing Ten Detection Methods”

Case Study 1



Figure 1: Summary of Results: adversarial examples on the MNIST and CIFAR datasets for each defense we study. The first row corresponds to the original images.

- https://arxiv.org/pdf/1705.07263

Case Study 1

The Mean Blur Defence



3x3 Blur

Case Study 1

Results

FGSM

Defence Unaware Attacker
(Non adaptive C&W Attack)

20% of adversarial examples work

Case Study 1

Equivalent to convolutional layer



3x3 Blur

Model

"Dog!"

$$\mathbf{F'(x) = F\,(blur(x))}$$

Case Study 1

	Results
FGSM	✓
Defence Unaware Attacker *(Non adaptive C&W Attack)*	20% of adversarial examples work
Defence Aware attacker *(Adaptive C&W Attack)*	✗

Lessons Learned

- Perform strong attacks
- Perform adaptive attacks
- Release code

Case Study 2
"Is AmI (Attacks Meet Interpretability) Robust to Adversarial Examples?"

Case Study 2



Fig. 1. (left) Original images; (right) adversarial examples defeating AmI.

- https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.02322

Case Study 2



Reject inputs where they disagree

- https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.02322

Results

- Median number of attempts: 25
- 100% success rate even with this naive attack

Lessons Learned

- Apply transfer attacks
- Specify a threat model

Common Pitfalls

Common Pitfalls

- **Apply a diverse set of attacks**

Common Pitfalls

- Apply a diverse set of attacks

- **For randomized defences, properly ensemble over randomness**



(a) Loss of original model



(c) Loss of model, averaged over many evaluations

Common Pitfalls

- Apply a diverse set of attacks
- For randomized defences, properly ensemble over randomness
- **Apply differentiable techniques for non-differentiable components**



- https://arxiv.org/pdf/1611.03814

Common Pitfalls

- Apply a diverse set of attacks
- For randomized defences, properly ensemble over randomness
- Apply differentiable techniques for non-differentiable components
- **Verify that the attacks have converged under the selected hyperparameters**

Common Pitfalls

- Apply a diverse set of attacks
- For randomized defences, properly ensemble over randomness
- Apply differentiable techniques for non-differentiable components
- Verify that the attacks have converged under the selected hyperparameters
- **Carefully investigate attack hyperparameters and report those selected**

Common Pitfalls

- Apply a diverse set of attacks
- For randomized defences, properly ensemble over randomness
- Apply differentiable techniques for non-differentiable components
- Verify that the attacks have converged under the selected hyperparameters
- Carefully investigate attack hyperparameters and report those selected
- **Compare against prior work and explain important differences**

Case Study 3
“Evaluating the Robustness of the *Ensemble Everything Everywhere* Defense”

Case Study 3: Evaluating the Robustness of the "Ensemble Everything Everywhere" Defense



- https://arxiv.org/pdf/2408.05446

Case Study 3: Evaluating the Robustness of the "Ensemble Everything Everywhere" Defense



- https://arxiv.org/pdf/2408.05446

Case Study 3: Evaluating the Robustness of the “Ensemble Everything Everywhere” Defense



(a) Loss of original model

(b) Loss of model with randomness disabled

(c) Loss of model, averaged over many evaluations

- https://arxiv.org/pdf/2411.14834

How did they break it?

- Standard PGD (500 iterations)
- Transfer from a model without the ensembling
- **EoT:** Approximate the expected value of the gradient by performing multiple backward passes with different randomness.



(a) Loss of original model (b) Loss of model with randomness disabled (c) Loss of model, averaged over many evaluations

- https://arxiv.org/pdf/2411.14834

Case Study 3: Evaluating the Robustness of the "Ensemble Everything Everywhere" Defense

	Accuracy (%)	
Attack	CIFAR-10	CIFAR-100
None	88.9 ± 2.8	64.1 ± 2.4
AutoAttack	61.8 ± 2.3	47.9 ± 2.7
PGD	54.0 ± 2.0	34.6 ± 4.0
+ transfer	32.6 ± 1.9	22.2 ± 2.1
+ EoT	27.5 ± 2.3	19.5 ± 1.5
+ bag of tricks	11.3 ± 2.5	13.8 ± 2.1

- https://arxiv.org/pdf/2411.14834

Lessons Learned

- Apply strong attacks like PGD
- Use adaptive attacks
- Check for gradient masking
  (And, if applicable, try transfer attacks or ensembling over randomness)

Conclusion and Key Takeaway

"The first principle [of research] is that you must not fool yourself — and you are the easiest person to fool."

- Richard Feynman

Strengths, Criticisms, and Limitations

Strengths, Criticisms, and Limitations

Well written and thorough

Strengths, Criticisms, and Limitations

- Well written and thorough
- **Establishes a rigorous standard for evaluating defences in the field.**
  (Adaptive attacks have become the de facto standard for evaluating defenses to adversarial examples)

Strengths, Criticisms, and Limitations

- **Well written and thorough**
- **Establishes a rigorous standard for evaluating defences in the field.**
(Adaptive attacks have become the de facto standard for evaluating defenses to adversarial examples)
- **Promotes openness and reproducibility**

Strengths, Criticisms, and Limitations

- **Well written and thorough**
- **Establishes a rigorous standard for evaluating defences in the field.**
  (Adaptive attacks have become the de facto standard for evaluating defenses to adversarial examples)
- **Promotes openness and reproducibility**
- **“Living document”**
  (Encourages researchers to participate and further improve this paper)

Strengths, Criticisms, and Limitations

- **Well written and thorough**
- **Establishes a rigorous standard for evaluating defences in the field.**
  (Adaptive attacks have become the de facto standard for evaluating defenses to adversarial examples)
- **Promotes openness and reproducibility**
- **"Living document"**
  (Encourages researchers to participate and further improve this paper)
- **High bar for evaluation**
  (suggests the need to assume an "infinitely thorough" adversary)

Thank you

Q&A / Discussion Time!

Images in presentation from freepik.com and various papers (sources on individual slides)

Extra 1



- https://arxiv.org/pdf/1705.07204

Extra 2

$$\min_{x'} \; \|x' - x\|_p + c \cdot f(x')$$

- https://arxiv.org/pdf/1705.07204

Extra 3

- Perturbation budget ϵ
- Similarity metric D (e.g., Lp-norm)

$$\mathcal{D}(x, x') \leq \epsilon$$



$$\mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{X}}\left[\max_{x':\mathcal{D}(x,x')<\epsilon} L\big(f(x'), y\big)\right]$$

$$\mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{X}}\left[\min_{x'\in A_{x,y}} \mathcal{D}(x, x')\right]$$

- https://medium.com/data-science/know-your-enemy-7f7c5038bdf3

Adversarial robustness is usually intractable and must be approximated in practice.

Extra 4



- https://arxiv.org/pdf/1705.07204